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THE OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER, AND IS CONTRARY TO,
ALL FINAL CASES IN POINT
This case involves whether a mortgagee must account
for use of tax reserves paid by the mortgagor.

It is a case

of first impression in Utah and is enormously important.

It

is filed as a class action, could affect more than 20,000
mortgagors of defendant, and could involve millions of
dollars.

It will affect every mortgage lender in the state

and may create scores of class actions in the courts of the
state involving many, many millions of dollars.

It will

affect the availability of Utah lenders' residential mortgage funds by affecting their ability to sell mortgages on
the national market.

The significance of the case may have

been obscured to the Court because the named plaintiffs'
case involved only $13.70 per year.
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POINT I
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENTS ON PUBLIC POLICY
ARE ILL FOUNDED
Prudential has devoted the major portion of its brief to
public policy arguments. Madsen has two general responses to such
arguments:
First, public policy arguments should play no role in a
summary judgment proceeding.

The reason is simple. Summary judgment

is appropriate where there is no material fact in issue and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The public policy considerations raised by Prudential depend on "material facts in issue."
If this case is to be influenced by fact-related policy considerations,
the matter should be remanded for further factual development by a
trial. As the record now stands, all of Prudential's policy arguments
are merely unsupported self-serving speculation.
Prudential's public policy arguments basically boil down to
scare tactics. Prudential argues at length about all of the dire
results that will follow if it loses. The argument apparently goes
like this:
1. The home mortgage business is important to society.
2.

The home mortgage business is complicated.

3.

The home mortgage business now works well.

4.

The courts should not tamper with an important economic
system which seems to be working well.

5. Madsen's potential recovery is minimal.
6.

The courts should not break up an important economic

institution simply to provide some minimal relief to
Madsen.
That is a very appealing argument. The trouble is that all
of the premises are false. For example, Prudential argues that, "the
claim of Madsen, if successful, would adversely affect the marketability of mortgages in the secondary market."

Brief of Respondent,

p. 7. However, there is simply no basis in this record to conclude
that this or any one of Prudential's other scare stories would come
true if Madsen wins this case.
This has been conclusively demonstrated by the recent action
of the Bank of America (see Brief of Appellant, p.18-19).
America is the largest banking institution in the world.

The Bank of
It has

voluntarily started a program to pay a regular passbook savings rate
of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Not one of Prudential's
scare stories has come true to haunt Bank of America.
Madsen is tempted to respond in kind by theorizing for several
pages on the beneficial economic results of requiring Prudential to pay
interest on the impound funds. However, it is difficult to see how such
speculation by either Madsen or Prudential is material to this lawsuit.

POINT II
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Prudential's brief is laced with arguments about what the
parties intended.

Apparently, Prudential's position is that the parties

did not intend that interest be paid on the impound funds, and that the
contract should be construed to follow the intent of the parties.
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The problem is that in a contract case intent is a jury
issue.

In other words, if the contract is on its face unambiguous,

the court can grant summary judgment as a matter of law.

However, if

the contract is ambiguous, the court may look to the intent of the
parties as an aid in construction.

However, intent is a fact issue

and cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, 366 F.Supp. 464 (1973 DC Del.),
Ball v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 58 FRD.362 (1973 DC Ky.).

POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
IS INAPPLICABLE
Prudentialfs argument on practical construction is but
another way for the court to determine the intent of the parties.
Madsen has already responded to the "intent" argument in Point II
above.

However, something further needs to be said about the doctrine

of practical construction.
Prudential's argument is basically that no one has ever
complained about Prudential keeping the profits on the impound funds
—

therefore the parties must have intended that Prudential could keep

the profits.
There is, however, one fatal flaw in the argument.

It is

true that at the time the contract was signed Madsen did not demand
or expect profits on the impound funds. However, there is nothing in
this record to show that Madsen was ever aware that Prudential was
investing the funds and earning a profit on such investments.
Certainly Prudential made no such disclosure.
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This lawsuit arises because Prudential, without the knowledge
or consent of Madsen, invested the impound funds and earned a profit.
Madsen seeks a share of that profit. The doctrine of practical
construction cannot apply here because Madsen did not know that
Prudential had invested his money and earned a profit thereon. Madsen
could not ask for his share of the earnings since he did not know that
such earnings existed.

POINT IV
PRUDENTIAL HAS AVOIDED THE CENTRAL ISSUE
OF A COMMON LAW PLEDGE
Madsen1s major thesis is that Prudential holds the impound
funds as a common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is liable
to the pledgor for any profit or increase in the pledged property.
Prudential attempts to dispose of this important issue in
one short paragraph by arguing that "a pledge is the passing of a
chattel."

Brief of Respondent, p.30-31.
However, at common law money was considered a chattel and

could be pledged.

In 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 385, it is said:

"That things personal, by our law, not only includes
things moveable, but also something more; the whole of
which is comprehended under the general name of
chattels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, is a French
word signifying goods. 'In the grand coustumier of
Normandy, (he observes) a chattel is described as a
mere moveable, but at the same time is set in opposition to a fief or feud so that not only goods, but
whatever was not a feud, were accounted chattels; and
it is in this latter, more extended negative sense,
that our law adopts it'. . . ."
From Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th Ed.) we learn that
fief and feud were freehold estates in land.
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Thus, anything which is

not a freehold estate in land is a chattel.
This definition of chattel was adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States in In re Gay's Gold, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 358 (1871).
There it was said, "the word chattel, in its ordinary signification,
includes every species of property which is not real or freehold. . . ."
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 362.
As to money specifically, State v. Bartlett, 55 Me.200 (1867)
held that money is a chattel. That case was a prosecution for larceny
"of the goods and chattels" of several people. The defendant asserted
that money was neither a good nor a chattel; therefore, the indictment
was defective.

The Maine Supreme Court, quoting from Holthouse's Law

Dictionary, held:

"Chattels personal are generally such as are

moveable and may be carried about the person of the owner wherever he
pleases to go; such as money . . . ."

55 Me. 210.

Similarly, in Gockstetter v. Williams, 9 F.2d 928 (D. Mont.
1925), which involved the insolvency of a bank, the court held that
personal property includes money, and all things of a personal nature
are under the heading chattel.
Therefore, it is apparent that money was considered a
chattel at common law.

It does not seem to have ever been questioned

that money could be pledged, the same as any other chattel.

POINT V.
CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY PRUDENTIAL
IS NOT IN POINT
Prudential cites seventeen cases in support of its position.
Brief of Respondent, p.22-23. However, not one of those cases is in
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point.

To begin with, all of those cases construe contracts

different from the contract before this court.
However, more importantly, not one of those cases speaks to
the pledge theory urged by Madsen.
on a trust theory.

Indeed, most of those cases turn

Madsen has not urged any trust theory in this

court.
In short, Prudential has cited seventeen cases which hold
that banks do not hold impound funds in trust. Madsen agrees.
However, Prudential has cited no cases which are in opposition to
Madsen's pledge theory.

At common law, the pledgor was required to

account to the pledgee for any increase or profit on the property
pledged. (See Brief of Appellant, p.5-9.)
Prudential relies most heavily upon Zelickman v. Bell
Federal Savings, 301 N.E.2d (111. 1973), and Sears v. Federal Savings
& Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971).

It is true that the

agreements in both of these cases included the word "pledge". However,
neither of those cases analyzed the legal result of a common law
pledge.

Indeed, both Zelickman and Sears assume that the impound fund

was a pledge. The issue in those cases was whether a trust was created
by the "pledge".
"We must expressly reject plaintiff's argument that
a trust is created because of use of the word 'pledge1
in the note. . . . This contention is a complete
oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is: Every pledge is
a trust. This note contains a pledge. Therefore this
note is a trust. However, the major premise is completely
invalid. Every pledge is not a trust. Sears v. Federal
Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971)."
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It should also be remembered that Madsen's appeal deals
with a new and unsettled area of the law. Prudential has correctly
pointed to a number of cases dealing with related issues or different
fact situations. However, in such a new and unsettled area of the
law, this court should look with caution upon the precedential value
of a handful of cases from foreign jurisdictions.

POINT VI
THIS IS A JUDICIAL AND NOT A
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM
Prudential has made the argument that this dispute ought
to be left to the legislature. Prudential cites no authority for
that novel argument. Perhaps Prudential believes that the issues are
too difficult or too important for this court to adjudicate.
Madsen has presented a contract issue to this court. From
time immemorial, courts have construed contracts. This contract case
is clearly a matter for judicial adjudication.

Ross v. Oregon, 227

U.S. 150, 57 L.Ed. 458, 33 S.Ct. 220.

CONCLUSION
The payment by Madsen of impound funds to Prudential is a
common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is entitled to any
increase or profit arising out of the pledged property.

Prudential

chose the word "pledge". Prudential accepted the pledge. Then,
without the knowledge or consent of Madsen, Prudential invested the
pledge and earned a profit. On principles of law and justice as old
as civilization, Madsen is entitled to the increase in the value of
his pledge.
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